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Judicial Protection of Human Rights -




The development of human rights as a language for global
governance sets the tone for civil societyI empowerment in many
societies. Most human rights have been recognized by
constitutions. In fact, international human rights law has
increasingly been developed as a part of domestic constitutional
law so that protection and promotion of human rights become part
of the judicial function.2 Thus, the judicial protection of human
rights3 and constitutionalization of human rights may be two
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important objectives by which the rule of law4 can be preserved
and which may govern future human rights work. While there are
limitations in confining the human rights movement to both of
these formal mechanisms of protecting human rights, it will be
extremely valuable to critically analyze the nature, functions,
effectiveness, and limitations of both of these approaches to the
protection of human rights. For enlightened constitutional
theorists, "constitutionalism" is as broad a concept as democracy
itself (even broader in institutional terms), while judicial review is
somewhat narrower, but also encompasses an interactive process
with democratic politics in the Bickelian sense.
So far as the legal, political and judicial system of the Hong
Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR) is concerned, it
continues to change dramatically since the handover to the
People's Republic of China in 1997. While the rule of law and
social fabric of Hong Kong society has by and large been
sustained, there are enough indications to suggest that the
protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms that are
enshrined in the constitutional framework in the HKSAR have
come under threat due to recent developments relating to the
proposed national security legislation. The national security bill
that is being currently debated, known as the "anti-subversion
law," has brought in sharp focus rather familiar issues relating to
freedom versus security and above all, the role of government in
curtailing human rights and to what extent the twin objectives of
security and liberty are balanced.6 This debate is especially
relevant in the wake of global counter-terrorism laws enacted by
states after September 11, 2001 and allegations by civil society
groups that these laws curtail liberties.
Hong Kong's Basic Law has a robust framework for the
protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms, which is
further supported by the entrenchment of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) within the Basic
Law. The Bill of Rights Ordinance (BORO) underlines the
4. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The "Rule of Law" as a Concept in Constitutional
Discourse, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1,39-41 (1997).
5. See Hong Kong Government, Proposals to hnplement Article 23 of the Basic Law:
Myths and Facts, available at http://www.basiclaw23.gov.hk/english/resources/legco/
legco-article/articlc9.htm (last visited Oct. 23, 2004).
6. Albert H. Y. Chen, How Hong Kong Law Will Change When Article 23 of the
Basic Law is Inplemented, 33 HONG KONG L. J. 1, 7 (2003).
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HKSAR's commitment to human rights and the rule of law and
empowers the judiciary to ensure that the government of the
HKSAR fulfills these commitments.7 However, constitutional-
ization of human rights, or for that matter, judicialization of
human rights, as opposed to the development of constitutionalism
within the framework of human rights may not be sufficient for
Hong Kong. Given the fact that the concept of "One Country,
Two Systems" has been debated both within the HKSAR and
Mainland China as to what should be the right balance, Hong
Kong society needs to steadfastly safeguard human rights and
fundamental freedoms. '
Hong Kong civil society should maintain a constant vigil and
be empowered to ensure that human rights when demanded must
be enforced not just by judges and courts, but also through
people's movements. The challenge lies in the process of
increasing awareness about democratic governance with a view
toward sharpening and mobilizing public vigilance. The mass
mobilization and people's movement in Hong Kong in protesting
against the passing of the national security legislation
demonstrates the power of the people to engineer good
constitutional governance.9
Part I of this Article presents an overview of the principles of
constitutionalization of human rights and the role of judiciaries
generally in protecting human rights. Part II critically examines the
legal and constitutional framework in Hong Kong for the
protection and promotion of human rights. It also evaluates the
institutional mechanisms in Hong Kong that would ensure the
protection and promotion of human rights.
Part III analyzes the role of the judiciary in Hong Kong in
protecting and promoting human rights with specific reference to
the development of international human rights law in national
judicial decision-making. Part IV discusses the relationship
between civil society, constitutionalism, and human rights. It
argues that the present system of placing complete trust in the
7. International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature Dec. 19,
1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter CCPR1.
8. John K. Kwok, The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region under "One
Country, Two Systems": Design for Prosperity or Recipe for Disaster 15 N.Y.L. SCH. J.
INT'L & COMP. L. 107,107 (1994).
9. Liam Fitzpatrick, The Long March, TIME ASIA, July 7, 2003. at
http://www.time.com/time/asia/covers/50 1030714/story.html (last visited Oct. 23 2004).
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formal mechanisms like the Basic Law, the Bill of Rights
Ordinance, and the independent judiciary in Hong Kong to ensure
the protection and promotion of human rights is not sufficient and
does not do complete justice to the needs and demands of Hong
Kong society. The process of democratization and development of
constitutionalism is indeed an assertion of the human rights of the
people of Hong Kong to ensure a society that provides for
transparency and accountability in governance." It needs to be
noted that constitutional institutions are a core part of this process
of education.
Part V discusses the civil society in Hong Kong and its
relevance for human rights activism. 1 Civil society in Hong Kong
needs to be educated and empowered to ensure that they assert
their rights and freedoms.' The past experience of mass
mobilization in Hong Kong for resisting the actions of the
government of the HKSAR to pass national security legislation
will be used to identify the threats to the human rights and
fundamental freedoms of the people of Hong Kong and highlight
the weaknesses and insufficiency of formal mechanisms in resisting
such threats. In this context, it is useful to recall the maxim of John
Stuart Mill, the nineteenth century English political theorist-
"eternal vigilance is the price of liberty." Civil society can be
usefully engaged in the process of constitutional empowerment so
that the government of HKSAR is subjected to a certain degree of
direct accountability. The direct accountability of the government
of the HKSAR to the people is the first step towards achieving
democratization in the HKSAR, which is necessary to ensure that
other democratic institutions in Hong Kong perform their roles
and functions in an effective manner.
Part VI discusses the need for a Human Rights Commission
to strengthen civil society and social empowerment. This section
underlines the need for institutionalisation of human rights in
Hong Kong. Part VII discusses how democratic dissent and the
10. See Yash P. Ghai, The Rule of Law, Legitimacy and Governance, 14 INT'L J.
SOCIOLOGY OF L. 179, 179-208 (1986).
11. See Christine Loh, Civil Society and Democratic Development in Hong Kong, in
BUILDING DEMOCRACY - CREATING GOOD GOVERNMENT FOR HONG KONG 127
(Christine Loh & Civil Exchange eds., 2003).
12. See generally G.B. Madison, The Political Economy of Civil Society and Human
Rights, in ROUTLEDGE STUDIES IN SOCIAL AND POLITICAL THOUGHT x (1998)
(discussing the necessity of education in the creation of civil society).
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right to protest have implications for human rights. Part VIII
concludes with a discussion on the impact of civil society
empowerment on democratisation.
I1. CONSTITUTIONALIZATION AND JUDICIAL PROTECTION OF
HUMAN RIGHTS
Constitutions provide an elaborate framework for the
protection and promotion of human rights and fundamental
freedoms.' 3 Conventional wisdom states that when rights and
freedoms are written into the constitutions of different countries,
they are given a higher legal status and become central to the
political discourse in a society. Constitutions at their best may
provide the political and institutional venue for this discourse.
Constitutions are also written at a time when momentous political
changes take place in a country or society and the framers of the
constitution objectively attempt to transform the society.
Constitutional guarantees of human rights cannot successfully
ensure that these rights are protected, however, unless they
succeed in engaging the democratic processes in the society, an
empowering function that should be the goal of constitutionalism.1
4
It is important that there are independent democratic institutions
that function effectively in ensuring that the governance system
adheres to the principle of the rule of law and the constitution. 5
Constitutionalism should be understood to encompass all
such institutions. The judicial system ought to ensure that the
human rights and fundamental freedoms guaranteed under the
constitution are vigorously protected and any violation is duly
redressed. Independence of the judiciary is expected to overcome
any intrusions upon individual rights by other branches of the
government."b The fact that the judiciary has to protect the rights
of the people and also protect against infringement by other
branches of the government means that it has to be given a certain
degree of independence and autonomy in its functioning.
13. L.W.H. Ackermann, Constitutional Protection of Human Rights: Judicial Process,
21 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 59, 59-71 (1989).
14. See Michael C. Davis, Constitutionalism and Political Culture: The Debate over
Human Rights and Asian Values, II HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 109, 125 (1998).
15. William C. Whitford, The Rule of Law, 2000 WIS. L. REV. 723, 724 (2000).
16. Linda Camp Keith, Judicial Independence and Human Rights Protection Around
the World, JUDICATURE, Jan.-Feb. 2002, Vol. 85, No. 4, at 195-200.
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The international human rights framework has underlined the
relationship between the need for maintaining an independent
judiciary and the protection of human rights. The Universal
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and the ICCPR observe
that an independent judiciary is one of the safeguards for
protecting human rights. 7 The United Nations has formulated
standards for achieving an independent judiciary in its "Basic
Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary", which were
adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 1985." While
these standards do not have the status of law, the UN has held this
to be a model to encourage states to adopt them in their
constitutions.19 Furthermore, the UN Human Rights Commission
has appointed a Special Rapporteur to help monitor the progress
and problems in implementing these principles. 2
Constitutionalization of human rights alone is not sufficient. It
must be supplemented with guarantees for providing
independence of the judiciary.
Constitutionalization of human rights creates a theoretical
framework for the protection of human rights and from it flows the
various legal, judicial, democratic and institutional mechanisms
that ensure the protection and promotion of human rights. When
rights are guaranteed within the national constitutional framework
of various countries, there are numerous implications for such
guarantees.2 The provision of such rights within the constitution
demonstrates the state's acceptance of the importance of
protecting these rights at a conceptual level.
It is possible that such rights, even after being constitutionally
provided, may not be protected in practice. Under those
circumstances, the other democratic institutions in a country may
intervene. It is in this context that the judiciaries of various
countries have started to interpret the constitution in exercising
17. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 10, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. Doc. A/80,
at 73 (1948) thereinafter UDHR]; 1CCPR, supra note 7, art. 2, at 52.
18. Kaldor, supra note 1, at 475-88.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. See generally Yash Ghai, Universalism and Relativism: Human Rights as a
Framework for Negotiating Interehnic Claims, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 1095 (200))
(discussing the incorporation of international human rights in a few selected constitutions
of certain countries).
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their powers of judicial review.2 The history of the recognition of
the basic principle of judicial review, from United States Supreme
Court Chief Justice John Marshall's opinion in Marbury v.
Madison,2" down to the contemporary and progressive
formulations in the courts of India and South Africa 24 that
recognize economic and social rights for citizenry, has been a long
and arduous journey.25
The role of the constitution and the judiciary to protect and
promote human rights, while extremely important and
undoubtedly necessary, needs to be understood in different
political contexts. The judiciary is able to best perform its
constitutional functions only when the independence of
democratic institutions is guaranteed and the government of the
country is adhering to certain principles of constitutional
governance. Human rights and constitutional freedoms are too
important for the judiciary to be the exclusive custodian of their
protection and promotion, and most liberal constitutions typically
do not envision that.
Further, the formal mechanism of protection of human rights
through the constitutional apparatus and the enforcement of
human rights by the judiciary may fail, particularly when these
institutions operate under limitations. There should be further
space provided for democratic dissent and resistance to intrusions
on human rights. This space is also typically addressed by liberal
constitutions both in rights guarantees and democratic
commitments. It should be an autonomous space for the citizenry
to take upon themselves the task of protecting and promoting
human rights and fundamental freedoms. It is possible that
resistance from the citizenry can actually serve as a check upon the
democratic branches of the government to ensure that the human
rights of people are duly protected and that violations of any
nature would be met with serious criticism in the form of
22. See Christopher McCrudden, A Common Law of Human Rights?: Transnational
Judicial Conversations on Constitutional Rights, 20 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 499, 499-532
(2000).
23. See Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, Defending Judicial Supremacy: A
Reply, 17 CONST. COMMENT. 455, 459 (2000). See also Larry Alexander & Frederick
Schauer, On Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpretation, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1359, 1360
(1997).
24. See Christina Murray, A Constitutional Beginning: Making South Africa's Final
Constitution, 23 U. ARK. LITFLE ROCK L. REV. 809,837 (2001).
25. See McCrudden, supra note 22, at 499-532.
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democratic dissent. Importantly, people's resistance and
movements to ensure the protection and promotion of human
rights empower the judiciary in performing its constitutional
obligations of protecting the rights and freedoms of the citizenry.2
Organized people's movements to ensure the protection and
promotion of human rights can actually educate the branches of
the government in lessons of true democratic governance so that
people's views are heard and listened to while formulating policies
21relating to good governance.
III. LEGAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR PROTECTING
HUMAN RIGHTS
The 1984 Sino-British Joint Declaration (Joint Declaration)
28
provided for the return of Hong Kong to China in 1997.29 The Joint
Declaration also promised a liberal and autonomous constitutional
framework in the Basic Law within China's "one country, two
systems" formula.0 Michael C. Davis observes that the basic
structural elements of liberal constitutionalism are thought to
include (1) democracy with multi-party competition, (2) liberal
human rights protection, including freedom of speech, and (3) the
rule of law, including adherence to principles of legality.3' He has
further observed that with the exception of some limitations on the
level of democracy, the Joint Declaration promises all of these
elements in a liberal constitutional order.' With regard to the
human rights framework, the Joint Declaration provided for a
26. See Davis, Constitutionalism and Political Culture: The Debate over Human Rights
and Asian Values, supra note 14, at 109.
27. See Thomas M. Franck, The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance, 86 AM. J.
INT'L L. 46, 52 (1992).
28. Joint Declaration of the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain
and Northern Ireland and the Government of the People's Republic of China on the
Question of Hong Kong, Sept. 26, 1984, UK-PRC, 23 I.L.M. 1371 [hereinafter Joint
Declaration]. The promises of the Joint Declaration were stipulated in Article 3(12) to be
included in the HKSAR's constitution, the Basic Law.
29. Michael C. Davis, Constitutionalism Under Chinese Rule: Hong Kong After the
Handover, 27 DENY. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 275, 275 (1999).
30. Huang Jin and Andrew X. Qian, "One Country, Two Systems," Three Law
Families, and Four Legal Regions: The Emerging Inter-Regional Conflicts of Law in China,
5 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 289, 294-95 (1995).
31. See ROBERT A. DAHL, DEMOCRACY AND ITS CRITICS 223 (Yale University
Press 1989).
32. See MICHAEL C. DAVIS, CONSTITUTIONAL CONFRONTATION IN HONG KONG,
ISSUES AND IMPLICATIONS OFTHE BASIC LAW 28-29 (1989).
[Vol. 26:28:1
Protecting Human Rights in Hong Kong
comprehensive set of rights, of which more than half relate to
freedom of expression.33 It also guaranteed the application of the
international human rights covenants.34 The rule of law was
preserved by the application of the principles of common law, the
independence 35 and finality of the local courts in the HKSAR, the
supremacy of the Basic Law, and the right to challenge executive
actions in the courts. This may be interpreted to include the right
to challenge an action's legal basis under the Basic Law.6 Davis
has thus correctly observed that by "implication, this promised
nothing less than a full system of constitutional judicial review to
enforce a substantial bill of rights. In tandem with a degree of
democracy and a high degree of autonomy, the Joint Declaration
committed China to liberal constitutional government in Hong
Kong., 37 Another significant basic policy of the joint declaration
was the retention of the existing social and economic systems in
Hong Kong, under which:
Rights and freedoms, including those of the person, of speech,
of the press, of assembly, of association, of travel, of movement,
of correspondence, of strike, of choice of occupation, of
academic research and of religious belief will be ensured by
law.... Private property, ownership of enterprises, legitimate
right of inheritance and foreign investment will be protected by
law.3s
These rights were repeated in Annex I (section XIII), with
the addition of, inter alia, "inviolability of the home, the freedom
33. Hongju Koh, The Globalization of Freedom, 26 YALE J. INT'L L. 305.308 (2001).
34. See generally Johannes Chan, Hong Kongs Bill of Rights 1991-1995: A Statistical
Overview in HONG KONG's BILL OF RIGHTS: Two YEARS BEFORE 1997, at 7 (George
Edwards & Johannes Chan eds., 1996) (discussing various aspects of the Hong Kong Bill
of Rights and the Basic Law).
35. See Fu Hua Ling, Judicial Independence and the Ride of Law in Hong Kong, in
JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AND THE RULE OF LAW IN HONG KONG 149, 229 (Steve Tang
ed., 2001).
36. For example, Art II of the Basic Law expressly provides: "No law enacted by the
legislature of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall contravene this Law."
See Yash Ghai, HONG KONG'S NEW CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER: THE RESUMPTION OF
CHINESE SOVEREIGNTY AND THE BASIC LAW 305,305-07 (2nd ed. 1999).
37. See id.
38. See Yash P. Ghai, The Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance and the Basic Law of
the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region: Complementarities and Conflicis, I J.
CHINESE & COMP. L 30, 34-35 (1997); Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, Art. 5
reprinted in 31) I.L.M. 1310, 1315 (1991).
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to marry, and the right to raise a family freely."3 Yash P. Ghai
comprehensively summarized the characteristic liberal features of
the Basic Law, which is rooted in the doctrine of "one country, two
systems," when he observed that:
[T]he Basic Law has separation of powers, even though the
executive dominates the political system; it espouses the
ultimate aim of full democracy; it provides for an independent
and competent judiciary, it provides rights of a fair trial, with an
independent prosecutorial authority, juries, presumption of
innocence; an independent legal profession; accords generous
treatment to non-nationals; and protects a wide sphere of civil
society with considerable autonomy for non-governmental
organizations, domestic and international. 0
The Basic Law has an exclusive chapter on Fundamental
Rights and Freedoms of the Residents (Chapter III). Article 39 in
Chapter III creates a framework for domestic application of
international human rights in Hong Kong:
The provisions of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, the International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights, and the international labor
conventions as applied to Hong Kong shall remain in force and
shall be implemented through the laws of the Hong Kong
Special Administrative Region. The rights and freedoms
enjoyed by Hong Kong residents shall not be restricted unless
as prescribed by law. Such restrictions shall not contravene the• 41
provisions of the preceding paragraph of this Article.
Chapter III covers a wide array of the rights listed in the Joint
Declaration. It is important to note that the rights and freedoms
are entrenched in the Basic Law, as no law of the legislature of the
HKSAR may "contravene [the Basic] Law., 42 In addition to this
chapter, other parts of the Basic Law also cover provisions relating
39. See id.
40. Ghai, supra note 38, at 35. See also BASIC LAW OF THE HONG KONG
ADMINISTRATIVE REGION OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, arts. 45, 68, reprinted
in IAN DOBINSON & DEREK ROEBUCK INTRODUCTION TO LAW IN THE HONG KONG
SAR (1996) [hereinafter Basic Law]; id. ch. IV, § 4, at 135; id. arts. 86, 87, 35, at 135; id. ch.
VI, at 143.
41. Davis, Constitutionalisin and Political Culture: The Debate over Human Rights
and Asian Vahes, supra note 14, at 109.
42. Id. See also Basic Law, supra note 40, art. 11, at 127.
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to rights or the means to exercise them.43 For example, the right of
property and of the ownership of enterprises appears in Chapter V
(Economy), and the presumption of innocence and the right to
trial by jury is in Chapter IV (The Judiciary).44
In June 1991 the legislature of Hong Kong enacted the Bill of
Rights Ordinance (BORO),
45 which was based upon the ICCPR.
46
The ICCPR (along with the International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights, ICESCR)47 is an international human
rights treaty, which was adopted by the UN General Assembly on
December 16, 1966, and came in to force on March 23, 1976 in
accordance with Article 49 after thirty-five states had ratified 
it. 48
The United Kingdom signed both the treaties on September 16,
1968 and ratified them on July 20, 1976 both for itself and for
Hong Kong, which was its legal dependent.49 The actual
incorporation of the ICCPR into Hong Kong law took place in
1991, when the obligations of the government and the rights of the
individuals under the ICCPR started to be directly enforced under
the Hong Kong legal system. 5' The Joint Declaration established
the contents that the ICCPR would continue to apply in HongKong.5
During a tense period after the 1989 crisis in China,52 the
Chinese government was quite resistant to the BORO 3 as a British
attempt to usurp the Basic Law guarantees of a similar nature and
43. Davis, Constitutionalism and Political Culture: The Debate over Human Rights
and Asian Values, supra note 14, at 109.
44. See id.
45. Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, No. 59 (1991) reprinted in 30 I.L.M. 1310
(1991).
46. See Michael C. Davis, Human Rights and the Founding of the Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region: A Framnework for Analysis, 34 COLUM.J.TRANSNAT'L. L. 301,317-
22(1996).
47. See ICCPR, supra note7; International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights, opened for signature Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter ICESCRI.
48. See Ghai, supra note 40, at 1.
49. Id.
50. See HKSAR v. Ng Kung-siu and Another [19991 3 HKLRD 907, 920 (H.K. CFA
1999) (the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal (CFA) stated that -the ICCPR is
incorporated into the Basic Law by its Article 39").
51. Joint Declaration, supra note 28, ann. 1, § XIII, at 1377.
52. See generally, Jennifer Morris, Human Rights Violations During the Tianamen
Square Massacre and the Precedents Obliging United States Response, 13 CARDOZO L.
REV. 1375 (1991).
53. See NIlAL JAYAWICKRAMA, Hong Kong and the Itternational Protection of
Human Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN HONG KONG 120, 134-39 (1992).
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impose additional obligations on Beijing after the handover.
Ultimately, it consented to the continuance of the BORO, with
minor amendments, at the handover. To constitutionally entrench
the BORO before the handover, the Letters Patent, the then
constitution of Hong Kong, was amended to control the legislative
capacity of the Legislative Council. 54 The amendment reads:
The provisions of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, adopted by the General Assembly on 16
December 1966, as applied in Hong Kong, shall be
implemented through the laws of Hong Kong. No law of Hong
Kong shall be made after the coming into operation of the
Hong Kong Letters Patent 1991 (No 2) that restricts the rights
and freedoms enjoyed in Hong Kong in a manner which is
inconsistent with that covenant as applied to Hong Kong.55
IV. INDEPENDENCE OF JUDICIARY AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR
HUMAN RIGHTS
The courts of the HKSAR play an important role in shaping
the constitutional foundations of the Basic Law. Its interpretation
leads to the development of important jurisprudence relating to
constitutional law. "' The Basic Law has been perceived and
interpreted as a constitutional instrument that governs the
governmental structures and the relationship between public
institutions and people in Hong Kong.57 The courts have generally
ensured that the rights and freedoms of the residents of Hong
Kong are duly protected. Independence of judiciary has been
hailed as a sine qua non for ensuring the protection of human
rights and fundamental freedoms.58 While there are provisions in
the legal and constitutional framework in the HKSAR that would
54. Hong Kong Letters Patent, No.2 1991, reprinted in PUBLIC LAW AND HUMAN
RIGHTS: A HONG KONG SOURCEBOOK 19 (Andrew Byrnes and Johannes Chan cds.,
1993).
55. The amendment is now Article VII (5) of the Basic Law.
56. See Roda Mushkat, The Future of Hong Kong's International Legal Personality"
Does International Law Matter? A Post Handover Snapshot, 22 S. ILL. U. L. J. 275, 277-79
(1998).
57. Yash P. Ghai, Litigating the Basic Law: Jurisdiction, Interpretation and Procedure,
in HONG KONG'S CONSTITUTIONAL DEBATE: CONFLICT OVER INTERPRETATION 3, 41
(Johannes Chan et al. eds., 2000)).
58. See Emily Johnson Barton, Pricing Judicial Independence: An Empirical Study of
Post-1997 Court of Final Appeal Decisions in Hong Kong, 43 HARV. INT'L L.J. 361, 362-63
(2002).
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ensure independence of judiciary in Hong Kong, the Right of
Abode Cases and the seeking of "reinterpretation" of the National
People's Congress Standing Committee (NPCSC) raise serious
questions as to the level of the constitutional protection that is
granted to the judiciary." It also brings to sharp focus whether
democratic institutions in the HKSAR, like the judiciary, can be
depended upon when their functions are potentially interfered
with, or when the executive does not agree with the decision.'
In its judgment on January 29, 1999, in the Right of Abode
Cases, the Court of Final Appeal (CFA) declared unconstitutional
parts of the procedure established by the Director of Immigration
for application for a certificate of entitlement as a permanent
resident." As a response to the decision of the CFA in the right of
abode case, the government prepared a memorandum to the
Legislative Council dated May 18, 1999, where it outlined three
options: present another case to the CFA to give it an opportunity
to reconsider its previous judgment, amend the Basic Law, or seek
an interpretation from the NPCSC. 2 Without giving serious
consideration to the first of the three options, the HKSAR decided
to seek an interpretation from the NPCSC, before which the
government of the HKSAR asked the CFA to "clarify its
judgment.'
' 3
The NPCSC observed that the CFA did not seek an
interpretation of these provisions from the NPCSC in compliance
with the requirements of Article 158(3). 4 The NPCSC also decided
that CFA's interpretation was not consistent with the legislative
59. See E.g., Ng Ka Ling v. Director of Immigration, [1998-19991 8 HKPLR 902, 902
(CFA 1999): see also, Tai, Benny, Ng Sin Tung and Others v. Director of Inmigration, 1
INT'L J. CONST. L. 147 (2002).
60. Karmen Kam, Right of Abode Cases: The Judicial Independence of the Hong
Kong Special Administrative Region v the Sovereignty Interests of China, 27 BROOK. J.
INT'L L. 611, 624-25 (2002). For further reading, see generally HONG KONG'S
CONSTITUTIONAL DEBATE: CONFLICT OVER INTERPRETATION (Johannes M. M. Chan
et al. eds., 2000); F. S. Hong, International Decision: Ng Ka Ling v. Director of
Imnigration, 94 AM. J. INTL L. 167 (2000); A. R. Fokstuen, The 'Right of Abode' Cases:
Hong Kong's Constitutional Crisis, 26 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 265 (2003).
61. Ghai, Litigating the Basic Law: Jurisdiction, Interpretation and Procedure, supra
note 57, at 29.
62. Id.
63. See Cliff Buddle, et al., Judges Asked to Chrify Right of Abode Decision, 55 S.
CHINA MORNING POST, Feb. 15, 1999, at l.
64. Id.
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intent.65 Hence, it decided to provide an interpretation under
Article 67(4) of the People's Republic of China's (PRC)
constitution and Article 158(1.) of the Basic Law.66 The NPCSC did
not conform to the interpretation given by the CFA. Rather it
ends with instructions to the HKSAR courts to "adhere to this
interpretation.'7
The NPCSC observed that the CFA was wrong not to refer to
Article 22(4) and Article 22(2)(3) to it for interpretation as it did
not conform to legislative intent. The NPCSC interprets Articles
22(4) and 24(2)(3); it states that the Opinions of the Preparatory
Committee are reflective of the legislative intent of Article 24(2);
it states that the courts of Hong Kong must apply the
interpretation to these Articles as from its promulgation; and it
also protects the right to abode of those persons who were
successful parties in the CFA case of January 29, 1999.61
That the NPCSC has taken steps to clarify the law, correct
and direct the lower tribunals, provide instructions and guidelines,
and protect past rights demonstrates a significant degree of
exercise of powers wider than legislation.6 9 If the HKSAR
continues to seek references from the NPCSC, and this practice
becomes frequent, it will have the effect of eroding the principles
of common law and threatening the finality of judicial adjudication
and the independence of the judiciary in Hong Kong. While it may
be justified for the government to hesitate to acquiesce to
limitations on its powers to seek interpretation from the NPCSC as
this is expressly provided in the Basic Law, it is important to
highlight the fact that the methods of interpretation by the NPCSC
are significantly different from that of the courts in Hong Kong.
Typically, the NPSCS interpretations are politically driven,
discussions are secret, 'true intent' is invented to justify what is
deemed convenient, and they open up endless opportunities of
rulings which derogate from regional autonomy and the protection
of rights.7" In addition, the legal, constitutional, and judicial
framework of protecting rights and freedoms in the HKSAR is
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. See Davis, Constitutionalism and Political Culture: The Debate over Human Rights
and Asian Valtes, supra note 14, at 109.
68. Id.
69. See id. at 145.
70. See generally, id.
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threatened by the fact that it is possible for the government to rely
on Article 158(1), which can create a:
[S]hift in the concept and practice of legality in Hong Kong,
away from its common law traditions where law is a discipline
on the government and residents alike, to a more
'administrative' legality where the say so of the government
carries more authority than the law, and courts are effectively
subordinated to the government."
Ghai observes that this shift has not yet occurred in Hong Kong.72
V. CIVIL SOCIETY, CONSTITUTIONALISM, AND HUMAN RIGHTS-
THE DIALECTIC OF THE RELATIONSHIP
Civil society discourse is about the state of citizenship and the
essential character of good society."
[It is] about what shapes citizens and contributes to civil virtue
and engagement, and about what role the ordinary occupations
and preoccupations of citizens play in the public sphere and in
building the good society, about the function and place of the
associations that make u modern societies in the politics that
attempt to govern them.
The role of civil society in various points of time in history has
been to attempt to create some form of resistance to established
systems, so as to engage in the process of democratic discourse.
In this perspective, the debate can be traced back to Plato and
Aristotle, with the latter arguing against his mentor that the good
society was one in which human nature reached its ultimate
perfection through the practice of the arts of civil responsibility.
76
The term civil society, derived from the Latin societatis civilis,
refers to an ordered and peaceful society-one governed by law.
77
Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, developing the framework of
modern civil society described by Adam Ferguson, argued that
civil society encompassed the "ethical ideal" in its preoccupation
71. See Fokstuen, supra note 63, at 288.
72. See Ghai, supra note 57, at 33-37.
73. VIRGINIA A. HODGKINSON & MICHAEL W. FOLEY, THE CIVIL SOCIETY
READER vii (2003).
74. Id. at vii.
75. Lindsay Paterson, Civil Society: Enlightenment Ideal and Demotic Nationalism,
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with everyday relationships." Alexis de Tocqueville developed a
civil society tradition arguing that America's diverse associations
produced what he called "habits of the heart" and civil skills
necessary for political life in a democratic republic. 9 De
Tocqueville's cautiously optimistic approach is restrictive when it
comes to developing political associations however, which he
warned may threaten to tear apart the polity in pursuit of a
particular passionate interest.80
Ernest Gellner has maintained a fairly uncontroversial
definition of civil society stating: "[T]hat set of diverse non-
governmental institutions which is strong enough to
counterbalance the state and, while not preventing the state from
fulfilling its role of keeper of the peace and arbitrator between
major interests, can nevertheless prevent it from dominating and
atomizing the rest of society."'
This definition may be acceptable as long as it is inclusive and
illustrative. It is possible that different societies may have different
actors who can play the role of a civil society 2 and it would depend
upon particular social, political, and economic circumstances.
Constitutionalism is a principle that encompasses a variety of
political theory ideals, demonstrating a framework of governance
that is based upon human rights, fundamental freedoms, and
human dignity. Davis argues that constitutionalization is an
empowering aspect in engaging civil society." Stephan Holmes
argues that the measure of constitutional success is its capacity to
create public empowerment. '
Constitutional scholars often see constitutionalism in more
limited constraining terms. Walter F. Murphy argues that
constitutionalism, "enshrines respect for human worth and dignity
as its central principle. To protect that value, citizens must have a
78. John Morison, The Government-Voluntary Sector Compacts: Governance,
Governability, and Civil Society, 27 J. LAW & SOC. 98 (2000).
79. See generally, ALEXIS DE ToCOUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA (Doubleday
1969) (1835).
80. Id.
81. ERNEST GELLNER, CONDITIONS OF LIBERTY: CIVIL SOCIETY AND ITS RIVALS 5
(1994).
82. David Reiff, Civil Society and the Future of the Nation-State, 268 NATION 7, 7
(1999).
83. See Davis, Constitutionalism and Political Culture: The Debate over Human Rights
and Asian Values, supra note 14, at 109.
84. See id.
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right to political participation, and their government must be
hedged in by substantive limits on what it can do, even when
perfectly mirroring the political will." 5  Emphasizing this
constraining feature of constitutionalism may undermine its
empowering role. It is possible to conceive that even with a right to
political participation and substantive limitations on the powers of
the government, the citizenry may not be able to actively engage in
political discourse. In such a case, constitutionalism will have
failed. The active engagement of civil society with constitutional
political institutions can actually shape and develop good
governance policies within a country or a society. If we fail to
appreciate and develop this empowering role, constitutionalism
may fail to effectively work in dormant civil society situations.
The relationship between constitutionalism and civil society"
is profoundly significant for the preservation of the rule of law and
to understand the roles they play in ensuring the protection and
promotion of human rights. To develop a viable relationship
between civil society 7 and constitutionalism, it is necessary to
recognize that "constitutionalism is a dynamic, political process,
rather than a fixed mode of distributing power, rights and duties."8
It is not merely about constraint but about empowerment.
Constitutional "legitimacy thus is more often validated by political
and social realities than by formal legal criteria."" It is
persuasively argued that:
[B]road-based political socialization, generally expressed as the
creation of civil society, is a prerequisite to stable
constitutionalism. A theory of constitutional literacy has
emerged that contends that the polity must be educated about
the idea of limited government before such a government can
succeed. This view is based, in part, on the principle that
constitutionalism imposed from above, rather than being
allowed to develop from below, is actually authoritarianism,
85. Walter F. Murphy, Constitutions, Constitutionalism, and Democracy, in
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND DEMOCRACY: TRANSITIONS IN THE CONTEMPORARY
WORLD (Douglas Greenberg et al. eds., 1993).
86. Gordon A. Christenson, World Civil Society and the International Rule of Law, 19
HUM. RTS. Q. 724, 724-37 (1997).
87. Michael Clough, Reflections on Civil Society, 268 NATION 17 (1999).
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and has insufficient basis in civil society to be considered
"genuine" constitutionalism. °
This framework needs to be further developed to include civil
society9' and democratic governance perspectives within the
constitutional and human rights framework of public
administration.
VI. CIVIL SOCIETY IN HONG KONG AND ITS RELEVANCE FOR
HUMAN RIGHTS ACTIVISM
In a policy address delivered in 2000, the Chief Executive of
the HKSAR said: "In Hong Kong, voluntary organizations already
provide a vast array of services, but still have great potential to
improve in terms of both quality and quantity.... We will
continue to enhance our working partnership with these
organizations. Together we will build a better future of Hong
Kong."9'2 There is no indication, however, that the remarks
demonstrate any specific engagement with human rights NGOs or
democratic development organizations.
The role of civil society in Hong Kong needs to be examined
in light of the Article 23 debates and the recent debates relating to
democratic development in Hong Kong.9 3 Both highlighted the
need for Hong Kong to develop its own brand of civil society, one
that brings together NGOs, social welfare groups, and others
interested in preserving Hong Kong's status as an international
society with a certain degree of autonomy, albeit still as a part of
the Peoples' Republic of China.
The most serious issue with the proposed national security
legislation is that it underwent little democratic scrutiny.94 The
refusal of the Government of HKSAR to accept a higher degree of
90. Greenberg, supra note 85, at xix-xx.
91. Larry Diamond, Rethinking Civil Society: Toward Democratic Consolidation, 5 J.
DEMOCRACY 4,8 (1994).
92. See Patrick Ho, Contested Space: The Role of Civil Society Organizations in
Hong Kong, Presentation by the Secretary for Home Affairs, Government of the HKSAR
in the Conference on Governance, Organizational Effectiveness, and the Nonprofit Sector
(September 5-7, 2003), available at www.asianphilanthropy.org/staging/about/
RoleCSOsinHongKong.pdf.
93. See generally, Tom Kellogg, Legistlating Rights: Basic Law Article 23,
National Security and Human Rights in Hong Kong, 17 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 307
(2004).
94. Benny Y. T. Tai, The Principle of Minimum Legislation for Implementing Article
23 of the Basic Law, HONG KONG L. J. 579, 579 (2002).
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democratic discourse on all aspects of the bill, refusal to accept
critical engagement, and the absence of meaningful consultation1
5
has sent dangerous signals to Hong Kong residents and the
international community. The fundamental nature of freedom of
speech and expression is such that it has a direct and tangible
relationship with the exercise of other freedoms and rights.
While national security should be protected in Hong Kong,
during the course of formulating such laws, no government that
relies on the rule of law, including that of the HKSAR, can
compromise on the protection of human rights, fundamental
freedoms, and civil liberties. Verbal assurances by senior
government officials that the proposed national security legislation
will conform to the human rights guarantees of the Basic Law and
the ICCPR were insufficient and publicly perceived as highly
suspect in the face of opposition from the Hong Kong Bar and
lawyers groups.96 It is important that international standards
relating to human rights are steadfastly adopted by the HKSAR
while formulating legislation relating to national security.
Power-holders need to be accountable to the people who are
governed and such accountability can be assessed only on the basis
of the level of transparency and information that is available on
the nature and scope of the laws that are to be passed under
Article 23. It is pertinent for all people in Hong Kong to
understand and fully appreciate the implications of the proposed
legislation. Previously, civil society initiatives were galvanized to
bring such an understanding to all social strata. There was a
development of vibrant, broad-based, and institutionalized
initiatives, in the form of NGOs taking keen interest in mobilizing
people about the implications of such legislation. The government
failed to ultimately get its way on this legislation because of a
substantial civil society response.
It is important to recognize that civil society movements
should function in an autonomous manner and should be in a
position to take independent opinions on issues that affect Hong
95. See Michael C. Davis, Who defines national security?, Submission to the Hong
Kong Legislative Council, LC Paper No CB(2)201/02-03(1I), available at
http://www.legco.gov.hk/vr02-03/english/panels/ajls/papers/ajlsse II07cb2-201 - 1I e.pdf (last
visited Oct. 23, 2004).
96. See generally Michael C. Davis, Adopting International Standards of Human
Rights in Hong Kong, in HUMAN RIGHTS AN) CHINESE VALUES: LEGAL,
PI-ILOSOPIIICAL, AND POLITICAL PERSPECTIVES 168 (Michael C. Davis ed., 1995).
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Kong. Moreover, it may be noted that any law passed pursuant to
Article 23 will suffer serious legitimacy issues if it is passed without
the informed consent of the people of Hong Kong, because it
would therefore not reflect the public and social consciousness.
Such a law would face legal challenges under the Basic Law and
international human rights standards. Resistance and informed
criticism of the proposed legislation under Article 23 should not
only come from the Bar Associations, but also from members of
other disciplines and professional associations. For this to happen,
efforts need to be taken from all professions to create a greater
awareness about the proposed legislation and its true implications
for Hong Kong.
Adherence to the rule of law, by the power-holders and
preservation of the rule of law by the people who are ruled is a
sine qua non of any society that hopes to maintain peace and social
harmony. It is only through these initiatives that Hong Kong can
hope to achieve further social and economic development. The
government of Hong Kong has a unique opportunity to rise to the
occasion and seek a genuine consultative process before passing
any legislation under Article 23. This will send the right signals and
help to give greater assurances to all the concerned people in
Hong Kong and the international community that the rule of law is
entrenched in Hong Kong and has its own corrective mechanisms
for regulating government actions. The civil society movement that
has emerged in Hong Kong could actually serve as a watchdog,
along with the media and other organizations, to monitor the
judicial exercise of governmental power. 7 This movement could
also play a key role in bringing greater accountability and
transparency to Hong Kong's government. While Hong Kong has
an international reputation for successfully achieving positive
results in tackling the problem of corruption," and transparency "9
97. Telephone Interview by Open Democracy with Christine Loh, CEO, Civic
Exchange (Sept. 16, 2004), at http://www.opendemocracy.net/debates/article-l()-83-
2093.jsp (last visited Oct. 23, 2004) [hereinafter Christine Loh Interview].
98. See generally, C. Raj Kumar, Human Rights Approaches of Corruption Control
Mechanisms: Enhancing the Hong Kong Experience of Corruption Prevention Strategies, 5
SAN DIEGO INT'L L.J. 323 (2004).
THOMAS CHAN, CORRUPTlON PREVENTION - THE HONG KONG EXPERIENCE 365
(UNAFEI Resource Material Series No. 56, 2002).
99. Daniel R. Fung, Anti-Corruption and Human Rights Protection: Hong Kong's
Jurisprudential Experience, 8th International Anti-Corruption Conference (IACC),
300 [Vol. 26:28:1.
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in governance from the standpoint of a corruption-free society, it
needs to take more efforts to ensure that all decisions of the
government are made in a transparent and socially accountable
manner.' However, it is important that anti-corruption measures
adopted by the Independent Commission Against Corruption
(ICAC) in Hong Kong do not violate human rights."'
VII. STRENGTHENING CIVIL SOCIETYAND SOCIAL
EMPOWERMENT: THE NEED FOR A HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION
The absence of a human rights commission is deeply felt by
civil society in Hong Kong.0 2 A human rights commission would
serve as a front line response mechanism to ensure that there is an
institutional structure that works specifically for the protection and
promotion of human rights in Hong Kong. '0 While debates about
the appropriateness and necessity of the enactment of laws against
subversion, sedition, secession, and theft of state secrets in Hong
Kong is actively in progress at all levels, it is useful to encourage
the government of the HKSAR to consider establishing the
statutory and independent Hong Kong Human Rights Commission
(HKHRC).'14
availtble at http://www.transparency.org/iacc/8th-iacc/papers/fung.html (last visited Oct.
23, 2004).
100. See Christine Loh & Richard Cullen, Politics Without Democracy: A Study of the
New Principal Officials Accountability System in Hong Kong, 4 SAN DIEGO INT'L L. J. 127,
135 (2003).
101. For further reading on recent issues relating to balancing of human rights and
protection of corruption-free governance in Hong Kong, see C. Raj Kumar, Protecting
Human Rights while Ensuring Corruption-Free Governance: The Need for Establishing
Hong Kong's Independent Human Rights Commission (Part 1), HONG KONG LAWYER,
Sept. 2004, at 99, available at http://www.hk-lawyer.com/2004-9/Default.htm (last visited
Oct. 23, 2004); and C. Raj Kumar, Protecting Human Rights while Ensuring Corruption-
Free Governance: The Need for Establishing Hong Kong's Independent Human Rights
Commission (Part 2), HONG KONG LAWYER, Oct. 2004, available at http://www.hk-
lawver.com/2004-10/default.htm.
102. See Anna Wu, Why Hong Kong Should Have Equal Opportunities Legislation and
a Human Rights Commission, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND CHINESE VALUES 185, 185-202.
103. For further elaboration see C. Raj Kumar, Developing a Human Rights Culture in
Hong Kong: Creating a Framework for Establishing the Itdependent Human Rights
Commission, 11 TULSAJ. COMP. & INT'L L. 101, 101-13) (2004).
104. For additional information, see Further Promotion and Encouragement of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Including the Question of the Programme and Methods
of Work of the Commission, National Institutions for tie Promotion and Protection of
Human Rights. Report of the Secretary-General, U.N. ESCOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., 53rd
Sess., Agenda Item 9, U.N. Doc. EICN.4/1997/41 (1997), availabhle at http://www.unhchr.ch
[hereinafter Proposed UN HRC Standards]. See also, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL,
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There is no doubt that Hong Kong lacks a fully accessible,
affordable, expeditious, and an effective mechanism under which
individuals could seek redress and reparations for alleged
violations of human rights.05 Since 1.976 the governments of the
UK and Hong Kong have been bound by the ICCPR to formulate
legal remedies that are effective in practice for all victims of
human rights violations in Hong Kong. This is an international
treaty obligation and hence results in a legal obligation and not an
aspiration or evolutionary goal for the future. The Hong Kong
government has a duty to set up adequate human rights awareness,
education, and training programs, which would be possible by
establishing such a statutory Hong Kong Human Rights
Commission.' 6 Moreover, establishing the HKHRC now would
demonstrate a greater degree of sincerity and genuineness to the
Hong Kong government's claims that laws under Article 23 of the
Basic Law will be clearly and narrowly defined so that
fundamental rights, civil liberties, and freedoms of the people of
Hong Kong are protected.'07 It is important to recognize that some
of the countries in Southeast Asia have established human rights• • 108
commissions and hence, there is no need for Hong Kong to lag
behind such initiatives, particularly when the HKSAR has a fairly
impressive legal and constitutional framework for the protection
of rights."9
PROPOSED STANDARDS FOR NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSIONS, At Index: IOR
40/01.93,(Jan. 1993) [hereinafter Amnesty International Standards for HRCsJ.
105. See C. Raj Kumar, I-long Kong Needs Human Rights Commission to Build
Credibility, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Oct. 18, 2002, at 18.
106. There have been proposals for such a human rights commission in Hong Kong,
largely based on Australian model. See Anna Wu, Human Rights - Rumour Campaigns,
Surveillance and Dirty Tricks and the Need for a Human Rights Commission, in HONG
KONG'S BILL OF RIGHTS: 1991-1994 AND BEYOND 73 (George Edwards & Andrew
Byrnes eds., 1995).
107. For a general overview of NHRIs, see UNITED NATIONS, NATIONAL
INSTITUTIONS: A HANDBOOK ON THE ESTABLISHMENT AND STRENGTHENING OF
NATIONAL INSTITUTIONS FOR THE PROMOTION AND PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS
(1995).
108. For an analysis of the working of NHRIs in Indonesia, Philippines, Thailand and
Malaysia, see Philip Eldridge, Emerging Roles of National Human Rights Institutions in
Southeast Asia, 14 PACIFICA REVIEW 209, 209-36 (2002). See also Human Rights Watch,
Protectors or Pretenders? Government Human Rights Commission in Africa, 2001,
available at http://www.hrw.org/reports/2001/africa'overview/summary/html (last visited
Oct. 19, 2003).
109. BASIC LAW OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION OF THE
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, Apr. 4, 1990, translated in 29 I.L.M. 1511 (1990); HONG
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Human rights commissions are a relatively recent
development among the various mechanisms designed for the
protection and promotion of human rights.'"' The development of
these institutions has resulted in the states that have adopted them
now being better positioned to work effectively towards
guaranteeing human rights within their own jurisdictions. They do
not replace the role of the already existing legal and administrative
framework in the form of courts, legislative and executive bodies,
and many other institutions that are engaged in governance.
Rather, they are unique and independent institutions that play an
ideal supportive and supplementary role to the other institutions
that are engaged in upholding the rule of law in a democratic
society."' But the distinctive role of the human rights commission
in exclusively and specifically working for the enforcement of
human rights within a country raises issues of mandate
determination, functions, legitimacy, independence, institutional
autonomy, accountability, and performance appraisal in a direct
manner that are fundamental for the very sustenance of these
institutions.
The proposed HKHRC may be vested with the following
tasks: issuing annual reports of human rights in Hong Kong,
holding public sittings regarding systematic violations of human
rights, and advising governmental agencies on questions of human
rights, particularly when evaluating proposed legislations from the
standpoint of national and international human rights 
norms.112
KONG BILL OF RIGHTS. Ordinance 59 of 1991, translated, with Chinese text, in
CONSTITUTIONS OF DEPENDENCIES AND SPECIAL SOVEREIGNTIES. This law is in part
declared to be in contravention of the Basic Law by the National People's Congress
Standing Committee decision of Feb. 23, 1997; Family Status Discrimination Ordinance of
Nov. 21, 1997. Legal notice 92 of 1997. Chapter 527. Current text in 1990 AUTHORIZED
LOOSE-LEAF EDITION. Full text, as of 20(10, found at http://www.justice.gov.hk: Disability
Discrimination Ordinance of Sept. 30, 1996. Legal notice 395 of 1996. Chapter 487.
Current text in 1990 AUTHORIZED LOOSE-LEAF EDITION. Full text, as of 1998, available
at http://www.justice.gov.hk; Sex Discrimination Ordinance of Sept. 20, 1996. Legal notice
394 of 1996. Chapter 480. Current text in 1990 AUTHORIZED LOOSE-LEAF EDITION. Full
text, as of 1997, available at http://www.justice.gov.hk.; see Michael C. Davis, HONG
KONG AND CHINA: THE 1997 TRANSITION: ARTICLE: Human Rights and the
Founding of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region: A Framework for Analysis, 34
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 301,313 (1996).
110. See Linda C. Reif, Building Democratic Institutions: The Role of National Human
Rights Institutions in Good Governance and human Rights Protection, 13 HARV. HUM.
RTS. J. 1, 3 (2000).
111. Id. at 5-7.
112. See UN HRC Standards, supra note 11)3.
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The commission may also engage in the task of submitting
recommendations, proposals, and reports on any matter relating to
the government or any other competent body; promote conformity
of national laws with international standards; receive and act upon
individual complaints of human rights violations; encourage
ratification and implementation of international human rights
standards and contribute to the reporting procedure under
international instruments; promote awareness of human rights
through information and education and to carry out research; and
cooperate with the United Nations, regional and national
institutions of other countries, and NGOs."3
Human rights commissions are generally concerned with a
wide range of issues that affect the rights of individuals and groups
within a particular society, ranging from violations of civil and
political rights to discrimination. The precise authority and
function of each commission is defined by the constitutional
provisions, legislative acts or decrees under which it is
established."' Some commissions are limited to protecting rights
prescribed in the national constitutions, while most are
empowered to promote those rights found in the various
international human rights treaties and other instruments."16 These
commissions face the inherent danger of becoming tools in the
hands of the state, and becoming quasi-governmental eyewashes to
hide autocratic practices. The standards are relevant at every stage
of the commission's development, from the origin, determination
of functions and powers, composition of the commission, including
the appointment of members, complaints acceptance mechanisms,
investigation of those complaints and also the recommendations,
which may include punishment for the violator of the human rights
or compensation to the victim, or both as the case may be.
113. Id.
114. For a critical perspective on human rights commission, see C. Raj Kumar, Role
and Contribution of National Human Rights Commissions in Protecting National and
International Human Rights Norms in the National Context, INDIAN JOURNAL OF PUBLIC
ADMINISTRATION, Vol. XLVII, No.2, April-June 2001, at 222,222-36.
115. Linda C. Reif, Building Democratic Institutions: The Role of National Human
Rights Institutions in Good Governance and Human Rights Protection, 13 HARV. HUM.
Rrs. J. I (2000); C. Raj Kumar, National Human Rights Institutions: Good Governance
Perspectives on Institutionalization of Human Rights, 19 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 259, 265
(2003).
116. See generally id.
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The proposed HKHRC needs to function in a manner that
creates extraordinary credibility from other government
institutions, NGOs, people of Hong Kong, and other members of
the civil society. Its legitimacy can only be acquired through the
actions and the functions performed by its members. This moral
legitimacy needs to be built upon the institutional framework on
which the commission rests and would eventually help in
promoting an effective human rights community involving partners
from all the sectors within a society. It is indeed a very difficult
role and a lot will depend upon the members and staff of the
commission in inculcating a sense of purpose and belonging to the
human rights fraternity. The legitimacy of the HRC does not
necessarily depend exclusively upon the enforcement powers that
are guaranteed by the act, though they play an important role;
rather, the institutional integrity and professional competence of
its members and staff will play a dynamic role. The HKHRC must
create democratic space for their functions and be able to
command respect from the government, even when it engages in
vociferous criticism of some government activities. While the HRC
can serve to enhance the promotion and protection of human
rights, it should never replace nor in any way diminish the
safeguards inherent in comprehensive and effective legal
structures enforced by an independent, impartial, easily accessible,
adequately resourced, and effective judiciary in the HKSAR.
The interrelation of the work of civil society and human rights
commissions is significant for Hong Kong. Civil society can assess
the work of a human rights commission in fulfilling its mandate.
Furthermore, a human rights commission may not have the
resources to obtain all the necessary information relating to human
rights violations, and hence could draw from the experience of a
vibrant civil society in Hong Kong. The proposed human rights
commission in Hong Kong should develop internal mechanisms
that involve civil society so that human rights do not remain an
official or quasi-official discourse, but rather, that the human rights
discourse gets democratized. This democratization of the human
rights discourse can help immensely in the process of human rights
becoming an empowering language within Hong Kong and
possibly influence the policies of Mainland China as well."'
117. See Martin A. OIz, Non-Governmental Organizations in Regional Human Rights
Syst ems, 28 CoLUM. HUM. R'rs. L. REV. 307, 370-71 (1997).
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Civil society organizations and human rights commissions
need to understand that these institutions are performing different
functions and legitimate disagreements on issues relating to human
rights may occur in democratic societies and those ought to be
solved within the framework of the democratic discourse. Civil
society in Hong Kong can actually empower the .HKHRC by
bringing into focus the human rights issues that affect governance
in a particular society."" The critical engagement of civil society
with the human rights commission ought to be legislatively
guaranteed in the HKSAR so that participation of civil society
does not depend upon the decision of the particular members of
the HKHRC. This would pave the way for a healthy development
of institutional cultures that respect human rights.
There is a lot to learn from the experience of Hong Kong civil
society actors for the proposed HKHRC due to the different yet
complementary approaches to the protection and promotion of
human rights. The three key functions of an independent human
rights commission have also been identified by the Office of the
UN High Commissioner for Human Rights as an advisory
function, an educative function, and an impartial investigative
function."9 It is with these standards in mind that the HKHRC
should be established. The independence, impartiality, and
effectiveness of the proposed HKHRC and its members are factors
that would give true legitimacy to its functions and help in
performing its tasks in a socially fulfilling manner.
VIII. DEMOCRATIC DISSENT AND THE RIGHT TO PROTEST-
IMPLICATIONS FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Silence amounts to guilt when there is a duty to speak. In
commemoration of the sixth anniversary of reunification with
Mainland China, Hong Kong witnessed its largest ever peaceful
protest since 1989.120 It was, in effect, the largest demonstration
ever relating directly to Hong Kong itself. Even though the protest
was made with the core objective of resisting the government's
118. See Julie Mertus, From Legal Transplants To Transformative Justice: Human
Rights And The Promise Of Transnational Civil Society, 15 AM. U. INT'L. L. REV. 1335,
1337-40 (1999).
119. Proposed UN HRC Standards, supra note 103 (explaining the importance of
national institutions in the promotion and protection of human rights).
120. Philip P. Pan, Hong Kong's Siaimmer of Discontent, Spread of Unrest Feared by
Beijing, THE WASH. POST, at A01, July 15, 2003.
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proposals to pass legislation on Article 23, the protest and the
expression of the right to dissent are reflections of the state of
governance in Hong Kong. 2' The government of HKSAR has
obviously not sufficiently and genuinely engaged the residents of
the region on the need for national security legislation. The SARS
crisis and the government's handling of it only aggravated the
concerns of the people, and July 1st witnessed the deep and
pervasive resentment of the residents of Hong Kong on the
policies and approaches of the government of the HKSAR.
1 22
The protest brought to the forefront numerous issues relating
to good governance, democratic dissent, 23 and the human right to
protest and dissent. The residents of HKSAR have demonstrated a
unique sense of civic leadership by coming to the streets and
expressing their concerns in a truly democratic way. The right to
protest and the freedom to dissent is an inextricable part of
democratic governance, as it is also about enjoying political
freedoms and meaningfully participating in the decisions that
shape a society. It would be a mistake if the HKSAR government
does not take complete and sincere cognizance of the fact that half
a million people were on the streets of Hong Kong. This is indeed.
significant and government functionaries must recognize that at
some point, the distance between the rulers and ruled in the
HKSAR has widened.
Hong Kong is indeed maturing and is getting ready to
embrace democracy. But democracy is not just about elections. It
is also about accountability and responsibility, and in this context
the Hong Kong experience of people protesting in the streets can
have profound implications for the government developing
policies relating to good governance. The United Nations
Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific
(UNESCAP) has put forth the characteristics of good governance
to be participation, rule of law, transparency, responsiveness,
consensus-oriented, equity and inclusiveness, effectiveness,
121. For some useful insights on the development of governance discourse, see
Thomas G. Weiss, Governance, Good Governance and Global Governance: Conceptual
and Actual Challenges, 21 THIRD WORLD Q., 795, 795-814 (2000).
122. Pan, supra note 119, at AO.
123. For a discussion of developing methods of rights activism in states lacking strong
democratic traditions, see Obiora Chinedu Okafor, Re-Conceiving "Third Worl
Legitimate Governance Struggles in our Time: Emergent Imperatives for Rights Activism, 6
BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV. I (2000).
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efficiency, and accountability.24 The United Nations Development
Programme (UNDP) has observed that governance is the exercise
of economic, political and administrative authority to manage a
country's affairs at all levels. 12 It comprises mechanisms, processes,
and institutions through which citizens and groups articulate their
interests, exercise their legal rights, meet their obligations, and
mediate their differences. Dissenting and protesting does not
automatically result in lack of good governance, but if protests or
dissents are not heard by the government and people are not
allowed to exercise their right to be heard, then arguably there is a
situation that will culminate in a crisis in governance.126
The government of HKSAR should play a far greater role in
ensuring that it acquires and sustains the trust and confidence of
the residents of HKSAR, even though at present, the
representatives are not popularly elected by the people of Hong
Kong. The conduct of the protesters in airing their views and
opinions in the form of a democratic protest against the policies of
the government of HKSAR, including their concerns on the
national security legislation was truly remarkable. They are even
more remarkable if we take into account the fact that no one was
arrested. It is important that the residents of Hong Kong
understand that these protests have profound implications, and the
fact that the protest did not result in any violence or culminate in a
law and order situation only reinforces the matured, self-
regulative, and disciplined approach of the residents of Hong
Kong.1 27 Also, the seriousness of the issue is reinforced by the fact
that if half a million people were actually in the streets of Hong
Kong to protest, then, by any conservative estimate, at least two or
three times more than that number share similar views and
concerns of the protesters, but were not in a position to join the
protest.
Expression of dissent and protesting against the policies of
the government is fulfillment of civic responsibilities. The rule of
law that prevails in Hong Kong is not just because of the
124. What is Good Governance, available at http://unescap.org/huset/gg/
governance.htm (last visited Oct. 23, 2004).
125. Id.
126. i.
127. See Jimmy Cheung and Klaudia Lee, Turnout piles the pressure on Tung
admitistration Protest organisers threatent to besiege Legco when fhe national security
legislation is put to a vote next week, S. CHINA MORNING POST, July 2, 2003, at 3.
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government ensuring its preservation through legal, judicial, and
institutional mechanisms, but due significantly to the residents of
Hong Kong who have preferred to adhere to the rule of law in
pursuing their actions. The rule of law in HKSAR is not
necessarily eternally preserved and even assured, however, if the
actions of the government in response to the dissent are not
sufficiently forthcoming, civil society leadership in the form of
activism, by demonstrating in the streets, has the potential to
engage the government so that it may be forced to rethink various
issues that remain a bone of contention between the protesters and
the policy formulators.
In the short run, these protests may result in the government
of the HKSAR being forced to alter its position on Article 23. In
the long run the protest and demonstration by the residents of
Hong Kong can provide the impetus for the movement to deepen
democracy. 12 The people of Hong Kong may become more aware
of their rights and obligations and be in a better position to realize
the responsibilities that come along with a democratic form of
government. It is conceivable that civil society activism,
participation of various social pressure groups, work of the NGOs,
and the sustained activism of a free and vibrant media in the
HKSAR can result in the development of a larger political
consensus on issues relating to how Hong Kong ought to be
governed. Echoing Edmund Burke's words: "The only thing
necessary for the triumph of evil is for good men [and women] to
do nothing."'' 13 It is truly remarkable that the people of Hong Kong
actually did something; they rose up to the occasion and indeed
protested and recorded their dissent. The protest and the dissent in
itself have intrinsic worth, regardless of whether they are being
heard.
IX. CIVIL SOCIETY EMPOWERMENT AND ITS IMPACT ON THE
DEMOCRATISATION
The recent withdrawal of the controversial national security
bill by the government of HKSAR had brought to the forefront
128. Lilly W.Y. Heong, One Country, Two Ideologies: The Rule of Law in the Hong
Kong Special Administrative Region, 16 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J., 447,467-70 (2002).
129. See Fu Hualing & Richard Cullen, Political Policing in Hong Kong, 33 HONG
KONG L. J. 199, 230 (2003).
130. College Republican National Committee Poster, http://www.crnc.org/
do%20nothing%20poster.pdf (last visited Oct. 23, 2004).
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issues relating to enforcing governmental accountability,
empowerment of people, and above all, the effectiveness of
participative democracy."3  The government enthusiastically
promoted the bill so much so that it was ready to allow its passage
without any further discussion or including a few actively sought,
specific exceptions. But the fact that half a million people were in
the streets of Hong Kong to protest on July 1, 2003 forced the
government to stop and reconsider. Even after the protest march,
it was not conceivable that the government would actually
withdraw the bill and give room for greater public consultation,
democratic discourse, and indeed international human rights
scrutiny. But the constant pressure of civil society in the HKSAR
has proven to be successful in convincing the government to
withdraw the bill.
Civil society activism has demonstrated a great degree of
political maturity in Hong Kong. The empowerment of people to
question their governments is one of the true hallmarks of a
democracy.1 32 Participative democracy means that the people are
constantly engaged, involved, and heard in the making of decisions
that affect them.1 33 Interestingly, people's empowerment and the
development of participative democracy in Hong Kong have not
arisen due to legal, judicial, or institutional efforts, but rather, it
has been community-developed. Credit belongs to the local
NGOs and interest groups who slowly but steadily engaged with
the residents of Hong Kong and convinced them that the decisions
that the government makes do matter to their freedoms.1 34 This is
not an easy task considering the fact that the people of Hong Kong
do not directly elect the Chief Executive.
Hong Kong has become a laboratory for testing various
theories of democratic governance and civil society empowerment.
While stability and social order are important considerations in
democratic governance, the Hong Kong experience has
demonstrated that people's resistance to policies of the
131. For a discussion of the emerging right of the people to take part in the political
process, see Gregory H. Fox, The Right to Political Participation in International Law, 17
YALE J. INT'L L. 539 (1992).
132. Implementing Democratization: What Role for International Organizations?, 91
AM. Soc'y INT'L L. PROC. 356,372 (1997) (panel discussion remarks of Susan Marks).
133. See Fox, supra note 130, at 539.
134. Chris Yeung, Way forward Seems Obvious in IK, but is it in Beijing?, S. CHINA
MORNING POST, July 5, 2003, at 1.
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government can use legitimate resistance methods and indeed can
prove successful if there is wider social consciousness. The social
and political consciousness in Hong Kong was developed by a
variety of actors, including certain political groups, NGOs, public
interest groups, and the media.
The role of the media in shaping public opinion has been
profound in Hong Kong.3 5 Unbiased reporting and objective
analysis of issues are important for sustained public trust and
confidence in the media.' The fact that the government of
HKSAR did not address numerous issues raised by the Article 23
Concern Group and other local and international human rights
groups in the initial phase of the Article 23 bill-shaping process
affected government credibility."' The legitimacy of any
government rests upon some form of public trust; however, public
trust cannot be depended upon forever, even in societies that are
not fully democratic. The people of Hong Kong have developed a
certain degree of vibrancy when it comes to handling public policy
issues. Unfortunately, the government has yet to learn from this
experience.
While SARS was by and large successfully handled,"8 the fact
that there was hesitation to provide greater transparency and
accountability in governance was an issue that affected the
people of Hong Kong.' 4 The SARS crisis, the general downturn in
the economy and the improper handling of Article 23 discussions
shook the foundational faith of the people of Hong Kong in their
government. This led to the nonviolent and most orderly protest of
the people of the HKSAR.'' The civil society organizations in
Hong Kong had assumed the role of watchdogs in monitoring the
work of the government officials and departments, besides shaping
135. See Perry Keller, Freedom of the Press in Hong Kong: Liberal Vahtes and
Sovereign Interests, 27 TEX. INT'L L.J. 371,383 (1992).
136. For a critical perspective on media freedom in the HKSAR, see Richard Cullen,
Media Freedom In Chinese Hong Kong, II TRANSN'L LAWYER 383 (1998).
137. Michael C. Davis & C. Raj Kumar, The Scars of the SARS - Balancing Human
Rights and Public Healh Concerns, HONG KONG LAW., May 2003, at 58-67, available at
http:lwww.hk-lawyer.coml2003-5/Default.htm.
138. Id.
139. Michael C. Davis & C. Raj Kumar, Accepted principles can guide our response to
the outbreak, S. CHINA MORNING POST, April 4, 2003, at 1.
140. See C. Raj Kumar & Richard Cullen, Drawing Lessons from SARS- We are ready
for Democracy, S. CHINA MORNING POST, May 20, 2003, at 11.
141. See Janice Brabyn, 7ie Fundamental Freedom of Assembly and Part III of the
Public Order Ordinance, 32 HONG KONG L. J. 271, 280 (2002).
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the democratic discourse on policies that affect the social,
economic, and political development of Hong Kong.'
42
In their resistance to the passing of the Article 23 bill without
proper consultation, the people of Hong Kong have sought
accountability of the HKSAR government. The government must
understand that it is the people's right to seek this information and
is the government's duty to provide it. United Nations
Development Programme's Human Development Report 2002
correctly observed that:
[A]ccountability is about power - about people having not just
a say in official decisions but also the right to hold their rulers
to account. They can demand answers to questions about
decisions and actions. And they can sanction public officials or
bodies that do not live up to their responsibilities. 
141
This precious space that democracy can provide to people for
their participation in crucial public policy discussions is helpful to
sustain the public trust in government. The Hong Kong experience
has demonstrated that trust is essential for governance and it has
to be developed over a period of time. It is heartening to note that
the government of Hong Kong has withdrawn the bill.' 44 The
government must take all efforts to 'reach out to the people in
seeking their views on the national security legislation; however, it
must also provide full and complete information not just about the
content and character of the law, but also the potential
consequences, and the comprehensive set of safeguards, including
the freedom of the press provided for in any future legislation.
The government of HKSAR should deepen its discussions with the
Article 23 Concern Group and other human rights and civil
liberties groups in seeking their views and should make sincere
efforts to allay their fears and concerns with reference to the
legislation. It ought to be a genuine and transparent process so
that the government is able to get the message across to the people
142. Garry Rodan, The Prospects for Civil Society and Political Space, in
DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND CIVIL SOCIETY IN SOUTH EAST ASIA 55, 57
(Amitav Acharya et al. eds., 2001).
143. UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM (UNDP), HUMAN DEVELOPMENT
REPORT 65 (2000).
144. See Frank Ching, Starting Over, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Sept. 11, 2003, at 12.
145. See Frances H. Foster, The Illusory Promise: Freedom of the Press In Hong Kong,
China, 73 IND. L.J. 765, 767 (1998); Frances H. Foster, Translating Freedom for Post-1997
Hong Kong, 76 WASH. U.L.Q. 113, 119 (1998).
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of the HKSAR that "public consultation" means serious and
informed consultation. In a recent interview after the Legislative
Council elections in Hong Kong, Christine Loh, the head of a
highly respected think-tank, Civic Exchange, and a former
legislator, observed that there is great scope for fuller democracy
in Hong Kong, but still work needs to be done. 146 She said:
Hong Kong is on the path of incremental democracy. The
people have become used to voting. It's become a social norm.
And people want their vote to matter more because right now
the vote essentially elects a group of legislators who are seen to
be in opposition to the government - but we're not electing the
government. 147
X. CONCLUSION
In our concept of constitutionalism, moving beyond a narrow
conception of judicial protection of human rights does not
underestimate the importance of formal mechanisms of protection
and promotion of human rights in Hong Kong.14 ' Neither does it in
any way devalue the importance of developing democratic and
independent institutions in Hong Kong, which work to uphold the
rule of law by ensuring that the rights and freedoms of the
residents of Hong Kong that are guaranteed under the Basic Law
and the BORO are steadfastly protected. The fundamental
argument of including civil society in the efforts to protect human
rights in Hong Kong is to ensure that human rights discourse in
Hong Kong is democratised and results in social empowerment.
The handling of numerous issues by the government of the
HKSAR, particularly matters relating to the right to abide, Article
23 issues, issues relating to the development of democracy in Hong
Kong, and lately, the SARS crisis, have significantly demonstrated
that even democratic and independent institutions may not be in a
position to intervene when the government is affirmatively
deciding to take a particular course of action. However, civil
society in Hong Kong can play a very useful and dynamic role in
constantly keeping vigil over human rights and democratic
freedoms so that the government does not intrude into the rights
146. Christine Loh Interview. supra note 97.
147. Id.
148. See Paul Gewirtz, Approaches to Constitutional Interpretation: Comparative
Constitutionalism and Chinese Characteristics, 31 HONG KONG L.J. 200, 223 (20(0 I).
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of the people of Hong Kong. This civil society empowerment rests
on the moral legitimacy of people's participation in the affairs of
the government. Furthermore, the recent temporary success of the
mass mobilization of people in Hong Kong to resist the
government's move to quickly pass national security legislation
without any meaningful and informed consultation manifests in
the inherent legitimacy of such actions, as long as they are within
the confines of democratic dissent, and do not affect social order
and the rule of law.
The empowerment of civil society in Hong Kong would
inevitably result in the empowerment of the democratic
institutions of Hong Kong. As the judiciary in the HKSAR would
engage in interpreting the Basic Law and the BORO, it needs to
be supported by an active civil society that is engaged in human
rights activism in Hong Kong. Resistance to the Article 23 bill in
Hong Kong has remarkably taken the shape of actions to seek
people's empowerment and development of participative
democracy. This means that Hong Kong has inevitably embarked
upon its journey to embrace democracy. The government of
HKSAR needs to seriously think as to what it intends to do in
response to the demands for democracy. This, of course, has long-
term implications for the nature of polity in Mainland China itself.
These are serious questions that the HKSAR must consider to
prepare for the future governance of Hong Kong. Hong Kong's
image as an international city would be significantly enhanced
when proper steps are taken to ensure democratic governance.
Since the people have been empowered to seek participative
democracy through civil society activism, Hong Kong appears
ready to start the next struggle.
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